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El compromiso con la necesidad de ofrecer una “justificación ade-
cuada” de las decisiones políticas vinculantes que sea aceptada o 
resulte aceptable para todos los ciudadanos afectados, constituye 
uno de los rasgos distintivos de la idea de deliberación política tal 
como es concebida por muchas teorías deliberativas de la democra-
cia. Dicho esto, sin embargo, no sólo no resulta claro qué podría cali-
ficar como una “justificación adecuada”, sino tampoco algo mucho 
más básico: ¿cómo debemos interpretar el término “justificación” en 
contextos políticos? En este ensayo presentaré dos modelos de jus-
tificación pública. El primero está asociado con una concepción tra-
dicional en epistemología de la noción de justificación de creencias 
e involucra algunas ideas de sentido común acerca de la cuestión. 
El segundo modelo, particularmente influyente en la filosofía polí-
tica liberal reciente, estipula que ofrecer buenas razones (evidencia 
relevante, argumentos libres de defectos formales, intuiciones o jui-
cios morales considerados, etc.) no resulta suficiente para justificar 
una creencia o un conjunto de creencias frente a otros sujetos. Es 
necesaria, además, la apelación a razones que ya son aceptadas –o 
1. I presented an earlier version of this essay at a workshop on “Human 
Rights and Democracy in a Globalized World”, organized by Torcuato Di 
Tella University and The Center for Philosophical Investigations (CIF) in 
Buenos Aires in November 2012.
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pueden serlo como resultado del proceso deliberativos mismo– por 
parte tanto del agente que ofrece la justificación como de aquellos a 
quienes va dirigida. La meta de este ensayo es desarrollar un argu-
mento en apoyo de este último modelo de justificación pública. 
Palabras clave: deliberación, justificación pública, liberalismo, creen-
cia, aceptación. 
AbstRAct
The commitment to provide an “adequate justification” of binding 
political decisions that is accepted or proves acceptable by all citi-
zens concerned, appears to be one of the distinctive features of the 
idea of deliberation in the public arena as it is conceived by many 
deliberative conceptions of democracy.  Having said that, however, 
not only is it not at all clear what exactly would qualify as “adequa-
te justification” but also something even more basic: how are we to 
interpret the term “justification” in political contexts? In this essay 
I shall present two models of public justification. The first one, is 
associated with a traditional epistemological idea of justification of 
beliefs and involve some common sense notions about the subject. 
The second model, particularly influential in recent liberal political 
philosophy, stipulates that providing good reasons (relevant eviden-
ce, arguments with no formal flaws, intuitions or duly considered 
moral convictions, etc.) does not suffice to justify a belief or set of 
beliefs before others. There must be an appeal to reasons that are 
accepted –or may come to be accepted as a result of the deliberative 
process itself– by the subject providing the justification as well as by 
those he addresses. The aim of this essay is to develop an argument 
in support of this second model of public justification.
Key words: Deliberation, Public justification, liberalism, belief, accep-
tance.
i
Several philosophers have held the view that, when fea-
sible, regular decision-making procedures in contemporary 
constitutional democracies must be complemented by proces-
ses of effective public deliberation. A group of individuals deli-
berates about how they should act when involved in a debate 
where they evaluate the worth of different proposals –often 
opposed and irreconcilable. In the course of the debate and in 
order to ground his point of view or criticize alternative ones, 
each subject expounds considerations in whose weight and 
relevance he sincerely believes and deems accessible by and 
persuasive for his fellow debaters. Thus, by committing them-
selves to provide an adequate justification of their actions, 
subjects fulfill their basic moral duty to treat fellow debaters 
as agents who deserve equal consideration and respect. A fur-
ther central feature of the idea of deliberation is that it exclu-
des any appeal to coercion –either open or surreptitious– as 
legitimate means to encourage acceptance of a given propo-
sal. Defenders of the value of deliberation often maintain the 
assumption that it is potentially able to foster reflexive revi-
sion and, in some cases, the will to change individuals’ initial 
stances –preferences, beliefs, convictions, etc. – thus contribu-
ting to improve the epistemic quality of the tenets that will 
finally be supported. It is worth noting that this is a general 
description and it does not include features that define the 
more specific concept of deliberation that will be under consi-
deration in this paper. This more specific concept may be ter-
med “institutional democratic political deliberation” (hereaf-
ter, simply political deliberation). Besides the features men-
tioned above, political deliberation2 1) takes place in formal 
2. There certainly are other types of political deliberation. Citizens, their 
representatives and State officials also deliberate about the best reply to 
a political problem in forums that lack the authority or capacity to bring 
forth binding decisions. It seems plausible to hold that this kind of debates 
in the public sphere –as defined by Habermas, for example– are crucially 
important for an appropriate development and survival of public culture in 
a democratic society. Our focus on political deliberation in decision-making 
forums with binding power does not mean that we question the above men-
tioned idea.
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political decision-making forums; 2) produces decisions with 
binding force that concern participants in the deliberations or 
those whom they represent –in other words, it results in the 
implementation of policies by the state; 3) it is merely part of 
the decision-making process, which normally implies voting.
As just stated, the commitment to provide an “adequate 
justification” of binding decisions that is accepted or proves 
acceptable by all concerned, appears to be one of the distinc-
tive features of the idea of political deliberation. Having said 
that, however, not only is it not at all clear what exactly would 
qualify as “adequate justification” but also something even 
more basic: how are we to interpret the term “justification” in 
this context?
Let us briefly reflect in simple and schematic terms on 
what normally happens in political deliberations. Let us ima-
gine a deliberation between two individuals or parties that 
back opposite solutions for the same problem: allow or prohi-
bit conduct X, imposing sanctions to those who display such 
behavior. Leaving aside the interference of selfish interests 
that none of the parties would dare bring to the debate as 
a genuine reason to back its stance, disagreements normally 
derive from: 1) Conflicting factual judgments about the conse-
quences to ensue from the enactment of the proposed policies, 
2) incompatible evaluative judgments (where religious, philo-
sophic or moral considerations come into play) on the justice, 
correctness or desirability of those policies, or 3) a combina-
tion of both types of conflicting judgments.
Although there are exceptions, in most cases public deli-
beration implies reference to both factual and evaluative 
judgments. This fact has significant implications: whenever 
citizens introduce evaluative judgments in deliberations, par-
ticularly moral judgments, they commit themselves –at least 
prima facie– to the notion that it is feasible to provide an ade-
quate justification of such judgments from a cognitive pers-
pective. It would be senseless to attempt to deliberate about 
moral issues –related to justice as well as human flourishing– 
if we did not believe that our judgments in this field may be 
backed by reasons or considerations that will prove acceptable 
to our interlocutors and constructively subjected to criticism 
by those subjects. In view of these features or tenets of actual 
deliberation, it seems natural to refer to a notion of the idea 
of justification that highlights some structural similarity bet-
ween factual and evaluative judgments. Let us presume that 
an agent states, firstly, that the death penalty, when applied 
to certain grave crimes, does not bring about a decrease in the 
frequency of those crimes, as opposed to the opinion of many 
defenders of such penalty. Secondly, the agent asserts that the 
state may never have the right –for moral reasons– to imple-
ment this type of sanction among its citizens.
In an elementary sense, we might hold that justifying these 
judgments –regardless of differences due to their dissimilar 
status– implies offering an explanation of the reasons why 
they are deemed to be true. Laurence BonJour summarizes 
this traditional stance in epistemology, and firmly rooted in 
common sense:
The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth, a 
more directly attainable mediating link between our subjecti-
ve starting point and our objective goal. […] If epistemic jus-
tification were not conductive to truth in this way, if finding 
epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase 
the likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification 
would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious 
worth. It is only if we have some reason for thinking that 
epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as 
cognitive beings have any motive for preferring epistemica-
lly justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones (BonJour 
1985, pp. 7-8). 
If the justification of moral judgments enjoys cognitive sta-
tus it seems reasonable to affirm that the same considerations 
should be relevant. So we may hold, with Joseph Raz that in 
this field, “justification” consists in “explaining the truth of a 
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value judgment” (Raz 1990, p. 32). The concept of “truth” may 
be conceived in different ways. It is important to note, howe-
ver, that no matter how it is described it seems impossible to 
be removed from the process of moral deliberation. Basically, 
because it seems impossible to do away with it in any type of 
process that involves reasoning, assertion, belief or meaning. 
As pointed by Joshua Cohen when summarizing several the-
ses that enjoy significant agreement in epistemology and phi-
losophy of language
Truth is intimately linked to the notions of belief and meaning, 
both fundamental in an account of thought. Thus, beliefs are 
said to “aim at” the truth, in that truth is their standard of 
correctness; correspondingly, coming to believe that p is not 
true is typically “fatal” to the belief that p. Moreover, because 
truth is the standard of correctness for beliefs, while we may 
come to believe that p without deliberating about whether p 
(is true), when we deliberate about whether to believe that 
p, we try to determine whether p (is true) (Cohen 2009, pp. 
13-14). 
The final goal of deliberation in formal political forums is 
the justification of binding norms that aim to regulate the 
actions of individuals and institutions. Such norms are usua-
lly expressed through prescriptive statements to which it is 
senseless to classify as “true” or “false”. Within the context 
of public deliberation, however, offer a moral justification of 
those prescriptions requires to appeal to beliefs that subjects 
may justify, namely, beliefs whose truth claim they may be 
able to defend on appropriate considerations. If anyone states 
“social and economic inequalities must be linked to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity”, upon justifying that principle he would be expected to 
explain why he believes –that is, why he believes it is true– 
that features such as social background, skin color, religion or 
gender are irrelevant when it comes to justifying an unequal 
access to such functions and positions.
We may term the ideas we have just sketched, “standard 
epistemic conception of the notion of belief justification” (SEC). 
As noted, SEC is general and abstract: regardless of poten-
tial differences between factual and evaluative judgments, 
it applies equally to both types of judgment. Although many 
thinkers conceive of the idea of justification in these terms 
when they reflect on the kind of public deliberation we descri-
bed above, there is an influential alternative, particularly in 
recent liberal political philosophy. According to this approach, 
providing good reasons (relevant evidence, arguments with no 
formal flaws, intuitions or duly considered moral convictions, 
etc.) does not suffice to justify a belief or set of beliefs before 
others. There must be an appeal to reasons that are accepted –
or may come to be accepted as a result of the deliberative pro-
cess itself– by the subject providing the justification as well as 
by those he addresses. John Rawls has explicitly maintained 
this conception. He states:
[…] Justification is argument addressed to those who disagree 
with us, or to ourselves when we are of two minds. It presu-
mes a clash of views between persons or within one person, 
and seeks to convince others, or ourselves, of the reasonable-
ness of the principles upon which our claims and judgments 
are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justifica-
tion proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in 
common. Ideally, to justify a conception of justice to someone 
is to give him a proof of its principles that we both accept, 
these principles having in turn consequences that match our 
considered judgments. Thus mere proof is not justification. A 
proof simply displays logical relations between propositions. 
But proofs become justifications once the starting points are 
mutually recognized, or the conclusions as comprehensive and 
compelling as to persuade us of the soundness of the concep-
tion expressed by their premises (Rawls 1971, pp. 580-1).
We shall call it the “common ground conception” (hereafter 
CGC) since one of its defining features is agreement, effective 
consensus on a set of premises, taken as the point of depar-
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ture of the argument. Despite their significant discrepancy 
with Rawlsian political liberalism, Bohman and Richardson 
have supported in a recent article a deliberative conception 
of justification of political proposals that upholds the central 
idea of CGC. After criticizing the plausibility and operational 
problems posed by the demand that citizens should offer “rea-
sons all can accept” in political deliberations, they hold that 
political ideals of justification, legitimacy and civility should 
be articulated “in the modality of actual acceptance.” In their 
opinion:
Using the modality of actuality does not imply that one must 
conclude, with Hegel, that the real is rational and the rational 
is real. To the contrary, one is simply insisting that, say, actual 
agreement is what needs to be achieved. The hope is that 
citizens will civilly engage with one another on the basis of 
reasons that each actually accepts, that legitimate democratic 
processes will institutionally encourage this mode of engage-
ment, and that full justification will be reached in which poli-
tical decisions –which perhaps represent deep compromises in 
relation to people’s starting positions– will end up being found 
actually acceptable by all (all citizens, all reasonable citizens, 
or all affected) (Bohman and Richardson, 2009, pp. 21-22).3
The aim of the argument I shall develop in the following 
sections is to defend that thesis that CGC is an adequate con-
ception of public justification to guide political deliberation in 
democratic forums that have the capacity to bring forth bin-
ding decisions that concern issues of basic justice or constitu-
tional essences.
3. It is worth noting that Bohman and Richardson hold that, as is the 
case with their own stance, the conception of public justification and poli-
tical legitimacy proposed by Rawls is committed “with claims about what 
people ‘do in fact accept’”.
ii
My intention in this section is to put forward an argument 
in support of the thesis that deliberations focused on decision-
making on crucial state policies should be guided by CGC.
The following example will serve as a starting point: 
Two scientists, A and B, are working on different technologi-
cal applications of the same theory, ST1. It is a novel theory, 
with a significant and growing number of supporters within 
the scientific community. In view of the very solid evidence in 
favor of the theory, A and B are firmly persuaded of the truth 
of ST1. Needless to say, they both acknowledge that error is 
unavoidable in factual sciences and can never be deemed a 
trivial matter, regardless of how firmly convinced a scientist 
may be on the truth of a theory. Having said that, there is a 
major difference between the research project carried out by 
each scientist. Whereas A’s research would prove innocuous 
in case of error, B’s case is different. Given the special kind 
of tests and experiments that he must carry out, should ST1 
prove wrong it would cause huge damage: thousands of people 
–including B himself– might die or endure irreversible injury. 
On the other hand, as the people that may be potentially 
damaged have learnt of the risk involved by B’s research, they 
staunchly oppose any further steps in his work.
From an epistemic perspective, one may plausibly hold 
that A and B are equally justified in believing that ST1 is 
true. This is so because both have the same evidence in sup-
port of the theory. Are they both equally justified to act based 
on that belief? A’s situation appears to be a case in which the 
fact of being epistemically justified to hold that p –namely, 
“ST1 is true”– is sufficient justification of the decision to 
act on the basis of that belief. Obviously, belief that ST1 is 
true cannot by itself explain A’s decision to proceed with his 
research project. We must presume the agent has a set of 
aims or motivations as, for example, the desire to promote 
the development of his field, to become a renowned scien-
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tist, and so forth. Having said that, if A harbors that kind 
of aims, and he is epistemically justified in believing that 
ST1 is true, that seems to imply that he will also be justified 
to carry out a research program that presupposes the ack-
nowledgment and acceptance of ST1. What reasons might be 
brought to the fore against such conclusion? A’s actions will 
meet no objections neither from an epistemic perspective nor 
from two perspectives that are unavoidable when it comes to 
consider whether the decision to act is justified or not: pru-
dential and moral. This is so because should A be mistaken 
and ST1 were false, neither his well-being nor that of third 
parties would be impacted as a result of his work. Within 
this setting, not only is it reasonable to come to the conclu-
sion that A is justified to develop his research project but it 
would also seem odd and perhaps even unreasonable that, in 
view of A’s beliefs and ends, he should refrain from procee-
ding with his research. 
Although A and B share the justified belief that ST1 is true 
as well as the motivation to carry on with their plans, the 
situation of the latter scientist is radically different from that 
of the former. In case of error, there is much more at stake for 
B than for A. Let us presume for a moment that B assesses the 
situation from a purely self-interested perspective, leaving out 
all concern for the consequences of his actions on other sub-
jects who might be affected by them. Should ST1 prove false, B 
might lose his life or endure serious and irreversible harm. As 
opposed to A’s case, it makes no sense to say that in view of B’s 
beliefs and purposes it would be odd or unreasonable on his 
part to decide against carrying out the experiments required 
by his project. It is perfectly understandable that he should not 
be willing to run the risk of taking belief in the truth of ST1 as 
sufficient reason to act since there is an unavoidable and non 
trivial probability of error with dramatic costs. When we state 
that an agent is justified in his decision to act, we often mean 
that, though the decision is the result of an act of his will, it is 
not merely that; it is also supported by reasons with indepen-
dent validity.4 When A chooses to proceed with his investiga-
tion, the key premise in his reasoning is that the decision is an 
epistemically justified belief –the belief that ST1 is true– that, 
as such, is not the result of the will of that subject. Insofar as 
it is a justified belief it should prove acceptable to any subject 
with normal cognitive capacities and fulfill impartial and non-
personal criteria of correction. On the other hand, as we have 
seen, the situation is different in the case of B. The key premi-
se in his deliberation is not the justified belief that ST1 is true 
but a different thing, a decision, clearly reliant on the will of 
the subject: the decision to be willing to take the risk that ST1 
may be false and suffer the consequences it may entail. We 
know that B has no epistemic guarantee that would allow him 
to circumvent the weight of such decision, error is probable, it 
is not trivial and its relevance is intensified by the seriousness 
of the consequences involved. Taking the risk to act or evade 
such risk by abstaining does not depend on B’s beliefs but on 
his will. B might also present things differently: he might say 
that he has left out the possibility that ST1 might be false 
and has decided to proceed with his research. In this case, yet 
again, the key premise in his deliberation is not a belief but 
the decision, with no epistemic support, to take a probably 
false belief as infallible.
Deciding to act assuming there is no risk, might be descri-
bed more precisely by saying that the subject decides to act 
on the basis of an acceptance of a belief. Accepting the belief 
that p is tantamount to adopting the “policy” of taking p as 
given. (Cohen 1992, p. 4). In other words, it means treating 
that belief as true, within a given context of deliberation, and 
this entails ignoring, for the time being and for the purposes of 
4. No doubt, there are cases when the decision to act may depend enti-
rely on the will of the subject and does not require any reason to support it. 
That is not the case, however, when the actions of the agent cause a signi-
ficant impact on the well-being of third parties and we are judging things 
from a moral point of view.
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deliberation and subsequent decision making, the possibility 
of its being false. Beliefs are not normally seen as being under 
the agents’ voluntary control because, insofar as they “aim at 
the truth” –to use Bernard Williams’ classical expression– and 
this constitutes its criterions of correction, they depend on the 
evidence available –be it pro or against. On the contrary, acts 
of acceptance do depend on the will of the agent; in Jonathan 
Cohen’s words, they are “policies” that people subscribe to in 
the face of their beliefs (Cohen 1992, 9; Engel 1998, 146). Con-
sequently, and applying this conceptual framework, if B’s deci-
sion to proceed with his experiments depends on accepting the 
belief that ST1 is true, it is tantamount to saying that, ultima-
tely, it depends on the will of that agent.
Although the idea that B has the right to act as he wishes 
provided he is the only affected party might be backed, that is 
not the situation in the case under consideration. In view of 
the fact that other subjects might endure serious damage as a 
result of his actions, it is fitting to assess it from a moral point 
of view. From this perspective, it is clear that B has neither 
the right nor the authority to decide to run the risk of error 
in the name of the parties potentially liable to suffer damages 
or to behave as if such risk were non existent. As we have 
just seen, none of these decisions can simply be derived from 
the justified belief that ST1 is true –given the unavoidable 
and non-trivial character of the probability of error and its 
remarkable costs. Rather, they depend on B’s will. Why should 
B’s will prevail over the opposing will of the other subjects 
that would predictably be impacted by his action, especially 
in view of the relevance of what is at stake? Should B enjoy 
such authority to decide for the rest of the parties concerned, 
it would be tantamount to denying a fundamental moral prin-
ciple: the rule of equal respect for persons, as it would imply 
attributing special rights to B that the rest of the subjects do 
not enjoy. Definitely, that result is unacceptable.
The considerations above provide the starting point to 
develop an argument in favor of CGC. The ultimate aim of 
political deliberation between citizens in a contemporary 
constitutional democracy is not to justify beliefs. The point is 
to justify state policies; these are no mere sets of beliefs but 
rather actions. There is no doubt that the justification of belie-
fs plays a significant role within that process, but it is not 
the ultimate aim nor is it necessarily a determining factor. 
As we have seen, within some contexts the fact that a subject 
is justified in believing that p from an epistemic perspective 
is not sufficient for that subject to be morally justified to act 
on the basis of that belief. Whenever the action of the state 
affects the basic rights of citizens we witness a situation that 
is very similar to that of the scientist about to perform a risky 
experiment. In the first place, if the state makes a mistake –if 
it grounds its policies, for example, on false beliefs about the 
nature of the good life, albeit justified from an epistemic pers-
pective– the harm on those concerned shall be very severe, 
perhaps even beyond repair. Their chances to lead a valuable 
life, or at least minimally satisfactory, will be jeopardized. The 
rationale here is that the state alone can warrant the availa-
bility of primary social goods that guarantee people will have 
real opportunities to pursue their life plans. Secondly, as in the 
case of scientist B, it would be unreasonable to refuse to take a 
fallibilistic stance in the moral and political field. Even if one 
acknowledges the possibility that religious, philosophical or 
moral points of view may be liable to appropriate justification 
from an epistemic perspective (as it is characterized by ESC), 
it is not sensible to posit that infallible and definite knowledge 
may be achieved in this field. If such assumption is implausi-
ble even in the case of factual science, it seems unreasonable to 
judge it acceptable in religious, philosophical or moral issues. 
Additionally, there are good reasons to state that formulating 
a comprehensive view of the good life will always entail a sig-
nificant probability of error. This is due to the intervention of 
factors such as those termed “burdens of judgment” by Rawls: 
a) empirical evidence bearing on the case is usually conflicting 
and complex; b) agreement on the kinds of considerations that 
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are relevant does not entail agreement about their weight; c) 
key concepts we refer to –not only moral and political con-
cepts– are vague and subject to hard cases and interpretation; 
d) the global experience of the subjects, which shapes the way 
they assess evidence and weigh values, will differ profoundly 
in complex modern societies; e) different kinds of normative 
considerations may be involved on both sides of an issue; f) 
because of the need to select among cherished values, we face 
great difficulties in setting priorities (Rawls 1993, pp. 56-57). 
This list of difficulties not only accounts for the impossibility 
to reach wide consensus about comprehensive conceptions of 
the good life in complex and pluralist societies, it should also 
lead all subjects to acknowledge that the possibility of error 
in devising their points of view on the matter is consistently 
significant.5 Thirdly, as in the case of scientist B, where those 
who would possibly be affected by his experiments opposed 
his pursuing the research, numerous citizens will reject the 
purpose of modeling society according to a given religious, phi-
losophical or moral view. Because of reasonable disagreement, 
many will believe that the conception of the good life suppor-
ted by the majority group is false and that its political imple-
mentation will result in a dramatic reduction of their chances 
to lead a satisfactory existence. It is my hypothesis that the 
parallel I have drawn between the situation of scientist B and 
citizens in the political sphere of a contemporary democracy, 
imply that the conclusions that are relevant in the first case 
are equally valid in the second. Just as in his own situation 
scientist B is not justified to act on the basis of his belief in the 
5. If along the process of belief-formation we had to assess conflicting 
and complex evidence, we probably made mistakes. If the concepts we use 
are vague, we probably incurred in confusion or erroneous interpretation 
of their scope and meaning. If our global experience impacts on the way 
we weight moral and political values, we have probably been partial in our 
judgments. Similar considerations are relevant to the other burdens of jud-
gment mentioned above.
truth of ST1, despite having an epistemically appropriate jus-
tification of that belief, within the context of a pluralist demo-
cracy, supporters of a comprehensive view of a good life cannot 
be justified to promote it through the power of the state, even 
if they have an epistemically appropriate justification of their 
belief in the truth or correctness of such view –which presu-
mably includes factual and evaluative or moral considerations. 
Being epistemically justified to hold the truth of a belief or set 
of beliefs is not sufficient justification, in either case, to act on 
the basis of that belief or set of beliefs.
Let us presume that a group of citizens, that eventually 
becomes the most numerous, manages to get the state to enact 
policies that affect basic rights and freedoms of citizens. Those 
policies can only be justified in reference to the conception of a 
good life supported by the group in question. Evidently, other 
groups of citizens subscribe to conceptions that are incompa-
tible with those supporting the implemented policies. When 
the citizens in the first group promote those policies they are 
aware of the fact that there is a significant and inevitable pro-
bability that they may be mistaken, they know the disastrous 
consequences of error on those concerned and they are aware 
of the opposition of many of their fellow citizens to the imple-
mentation of the policies they promote. Under such conditions, 
members of the majority group cannot state that the premise 
that justifies their political action is the epistemically justified 
belief that the comprehensive vision of a good life they subs-
cribe to is true –even if they are really justified in affirm his 
position from an epistemological point of view. The key pre-
mise, upon which they base their decision to act, is an act of 
the will, another decision: they either run the risk that their 
beliefs, albeit justified, may be false and cause serious dama-
ge to themselves and to third parties or they leave out such 
considerations and behave as if they were non-existent. As in 
the case of scientist B, should the state policies only affect 
the members of the majority group, it is perfectly plausible to 
conclude that, if they reached an agreement, they would have 
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all the right in the world to make such decisions. The problem 
is that they have no right whatsoever to decide for the other 
citizens who oppose their plans. If they did –as if scientist B 
should choose to pursue his risky experiments– they would be 
imposing their will unilaterally, taking the fate of the other 
citizens in their hands and using them as mere means for 
the realization of their purposes. This would be tantamount 
to denying the equal respect due to them qua persons. Such 
result is totally unacceptable and leads to the conclusion that 
no citizen or association of citizens should enjoy the right to 
use the power of the state to decide on issues that touch on 
fundamental rights on the basis of the guidelines of the com-
prehensive view of the good life held by that person or asso-
ciation.
The situation changes radically when CGC is taken as a 
guideline for political deliberation. In that case, citizens must 
bracket their deepest religious, philosophical or moral disa-
greements and retreat to a common ground of beliefs and 
ways of reasoning that may permit them to provide justifica-
tions of their political proposals that, in actual practice, will 
prove acceptable by everyone. Taking that step is no infallible 
guarantee that the policies ensuing from the process of delibe-
ration are correct, or that the seriousness of the harm endured 
by those concerned in case of error is not significant. The fact 
that there is a non-trivial probability of error and that the cost 
to the well-being of citizens is always very high when policies 
impact on fundamental rights and freedoms seem to be an 
unavoidable part and parcel of state actions.6 Political dialo-
gue guided by CGC will probably not warrant that a unani-
mous agreement on a sole political proposal will be reached. It 
6. Accepting CGC and retreating to a common ground in public delibe-
rations focused on decision making does not cancel human fallibility or the 
weight of the burdens of judgment; nor does it eliminate the mistakes that 
may be made in the practical implementation of a political program.
is perfectly plausible that citizens will develop different inter-
pretations of the beliefs and political values that constitute 
the shared common ground. Compliance with CGC, however, 
requires decisions finally reached by the democratic process 
to be based on beliefs that all citizens acknowledge as episte-
mically justified and in ways of reasoning whose correct featu-
res are also generally acknowledged. Should this be the case, 
it seems senseless to state that the political proposal chosen 
by the majority is merely an expression of the unilateral will 
of a group. How could any citizen say that and, at the same 
time, acknowledge that the proposal is supported by epistemi-
cally justified beliefs and correct ways of reasoning? On the 
other hand, by voluntarily acknowledging CGC, every citizen 
imposes upon himself the duty to participate in a dialogue 
process where he will have to give up part of what he sees, in 
the light of his comprehensive view, as the full or global truth 
on the good life. After all, his aim is to devise political propo-
sals whose justification may prove acceptable by citizens who 
subscribe views that are incompatible with his own. Given the 
significant cost of that decision, it would be senseless if it did 
not also imply accepting to run the risks associated with the 
implementation by the state of the results of public delibera-
tion. 
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